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585 
AUSTRALIA MAKES A U-TURN WITH THE 
REVIVAL OF THE PACIFIC SOLUTION: SHOULD 
ASYLUM SEEKERS FIND A NEW DESTINATION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The picture we had in our mind changed suddenly because the 
Australian authority started to treat us like criminals. They transferred us 
to the Detention Centre in the middle of the desert, far, far away from any 
people. We were just behind the razor wires with security around us all the 
time, day and night, watching us.”1  
This was the experience shared by a myriad of the 1,637
2
 asylum 
seekers who remained detained in Australian offshore detention centers 
between 2001 and February 2008
3
 while their asylum claims were 
processed and reviewed.
4
 Mandatory detention in Australia is not a new 
policy,
5
 nor is the country’s policy of offshore processing, known as the 
“Pacific Solution,”6 which was formally ended on February 8, 2008.7 
However, what is new is the resurrection of the Pacific Solution by Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard just four years after she described the policy as 
“costly, unsustainable and wrong as a matter of principle.”8  
Human rights and refugee advocacy groups
9
 widely criticized the 
Pacific Solution as being “contrary to the spirit and the letter of 
 
 
 1. LINDA BRISKMAN, CHRIS GODDARD & SUSIE LATHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OVERBOARD: 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA 113 (2008). 
 2. JANET PHILLIPS & HARRIET SPINKS, DEP’T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION IN AUSTRALIA 10 (2013), available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/ 
library/prspub/1311498/upload_binary/1311498.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 9. 
 5. GEORGE VENTURINI, AUSTRALIA’S MALTREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
4(2012), available at http://www.countercurrents.org/venturini031012.pdf. “The policy of mandatory 
detention in Australia—that is the legal requirement to detain all non-citizens without a valid visa—
was introduced by the Keating (Labor) Government in 1992 in response to a wave of Indochinese boat 
arrivals.” Id. 
 6. Id. at 13. 
 7. Id. at 30.  
 8. Kathy Marks, Julia Gillard Revives Plans to Deport Australia’s Boat Refugees, 
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/julia-gillard-
revives-plans-to-deport-australias-boat-refugees-8038721.html. 
 9. VENTURINI, supra note 5, at 35 (UNHCR describing the policy as “deeply problematic”). 
Richard Towels of the UNHCR went on to explain, “[m]any bona fide refugees caught by the policy 
spent long periods of isolation, mental hardship and uncertainty and prolonged separation from their 
families.” Id. at 30. See also PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2 at 34–35. Research collated by the 
International Detention Coalition found that the common arguments put forward include: 
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international law, is inhumane, is largely ineffective in 
reducing/containing the number of unauthorised arrivals and . . . 
economically very costly.”10 Nonetheless, after an increase in deaths at 
sea,
11
 subjection to political attack for soft border protection,
12
 and failed 
attempts to introduce alternative measures to deal with the increasing 
number of asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat,
13
 Prime Minister 
Gillard agreed to opposition pleas to reopen offshore detention centers.
14
  
The purpose of this Note is to examine how, if at all, the reintroduced 
Pacific Solution differs from the highly criticized Pacific Solution of the 
Howard Government, and whether the Pacific Solution serves its purpose 
of discouraging new arrivals.
15
 Part II of this Note provides a historical 
overview of Australia’s refugee policy and the Pacific Solution; Part III 
examines international law relating to the Pacific Solution and the 
humanitarian and economical issues involved in such examination; and 
Part IV recommends changes that should be made to the Pacific Solution 
to ensure that Australia’s U-turn is a step in the right direction.  
 
 
Detention is not an effective deterrent of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in either 
destination or transit contexts. Detention fails to impact on the of destination country and 
does not reduce numbers of irregular arrivals. Studies have shown asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants either are not aware of detention policy or its impact in the country of 
destination; may see it as an inevitable part of the journey; and do not convey the deterrence 
message to others back to those in the country of origin. Detention undermines an 
individual’s right to liberty and places them at greater risk of arbitrary detention and human 
rights violations.  
Id. See also Matt Siegel, Reversal on Immigration Policy in Australia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/asia/immigration-reform-moves-forward-in-
australia.html. Domestic and international groups say, “the practice is cruel and violates 
Australia’s obligations under the United Nations refugee convention.” Id.  
 10. VENTURINI, supra note 5, at 40.  
 11. James Grubel, Australia Reopens Asylum Detention in Naura Tent City, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-14/news/sns-rt-us-australia-asylumbre88d071-2012 
0913_1_nauru-asylum-seekers-pacific-solution (explaining 200 died in December 2011 when 
overcrowded boat sank off the coast; 50 asylum seekers died in 2010 when their boat was thrown onto 
rocks at Christmas Island). 
 12. Id.  
 13. PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 10. 
 14. See Grubel, supra note 11.  
 15. Matthew Pennington, Australian Says Asylum Seeker Policy, Criticized by Rights Groups, is 
More Humane, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/australian-
says-asylum-seeker-policy-criticized-by-rights-groups-is-more-humane/2012/09/24/597f187c-067b-11 
e2-9eea-333857f6a7bd_story.html (Foreign Minister Bob Carr explained, “plans to send asylum 
seekers to Papa New Guinea and the remote Pacific Island of Nauru for screening was designed to 
deter human smuggling and would be more humane for the would-be refugees”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/14
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON AUSTRALIA’S REFUGEE POLICY AND 
THE PACIFIC SOLUTION 
Australia historically supported strict immigration policies due to racial 
and ethnic discrimination, commonly referred to as the “White Australia” 
policy.
16
 The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901
17
 used a difficult 
language test to favor Europeans and subtly exclude uneducated non-
Europeans from admission.
18
 Legislation following World War II 
concentrated on the removal of “Asian and other non-white migrants”19 
who fled to Australia to evade the war. In fact, to ensure that immigrants 
permitted to enter between the 1940s and 1950s did not compete with 
citizens for union jobs, legislation required immigrants to sign two-year 
contracts allowing the Australian government to determine their initial 
employment.
20
  
The 1958 obliteration of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 and 
the abolishment of the “White Australia” policy by the Whitlam Labor 
Government in 1973 marked a movement towards migration policies 
absent overt racism and discrimination.
21
 This movement continued as a 
bipartisan effort made by successive governments to foster the 
development of improved non-discriminatory migration legislation.
22
 
Since 1945, Australia has admitted approximately half a million refugees, 
making it “one of the highest rates of refugee resettlement per capita 
among industrialized states.”23 This has contributed to the international 
 
 
 16. Emily C. Peyser, “Pacific Solution”? The Sinking Right To Seek Asylum In Australia, 11 
PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 431, 436 (2002). See also Robert Birrell, Immigration Control in Australia, 
534 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 107–08 (1994). The central idea of “White Australia” 
was “the creation of a nation free of Old World social and religious cleavages, in which all could live a 
dignified lifestyle. It was believed that the importation of migrants who were Asians or Pacific 
Islanders would undermine these ideals by degrading the dignity of manual labor.” Id.  
 17. The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was renamed the Immigration Act 1901 in 1912, and 
repealed by the Migration Act 1958. 
 18. See Peyser, supra note 16. See also MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 13 (1998). The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 required applicants to “write out at 
dictation and sign in the presence of an officer, a passage of fifty words in length in an European 
language directed by the officer.” Id. (quoting Immigration Restriction Act 1901 §3(a)).  
 19. Peyser, supra note 16, at 436.  
 20. See Birrell, supra note 16, at 108.  
 21. See Peyser, supra note 16, at 436.  
 22. “In 1973, the short-lived Whitlam Government took bold steps to remove race as a factor in 
Australia’s immigration policies. The Fraser Coalition Government, which came into office in 1975, 
and the succeeding Hawke Labor Government in 1983, continued to stress multiculturalism such that 
Asia became a main source of immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s.” Id.  
 23. Tara Magner, A Less Than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 54, 58–59 (2004).  
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perception of Australia as a “leader among nations”24 in providing 
protection for refugees.
25
 
However, this perception is lost with regard to Australia’s policy on 
“boat people.’”26 Initially, the Australian public received the first influx of 
boat people, seeking asylum from the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
(1976-81), with sympathy.
27
 Sympathy quickly turned into antipathy as 
continuing arrivals,
28
 referred to in the press as an “invasion, flood and 
yellow peril,”29 created a skewed perception that Australia was losing 
control over its borders.
30
 In reality, “[t]he number of unauthorized arrivals 
in Australia—whether by boat or other manner of transportation—is . . . 
rather small by comparison to other industrialized asylum-providing 
states.”31 By the late 1970s Australia had three immigration detention 
facilities in Sydney, Perth, and Melbourne,
32
 although only a little more 
than 2,000 people embarked to Australia in the first wave of Indochinese 
boat arrivals (1976-81).
33
  
 
 
 24. Id. at 58.  
 25. Id.  
 26. JANET PHILLIPS & HARRIET SPINKS, DEP’T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES, BOAT ARRIVALS 
IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1976 1(2013), available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/ 
prspub/1782447/upload_binary/1782447.pdf. “Boat people is a term used in the media and elsewhere 
to describe asylum seekers who arrive by boat or attempt to arrive by boat without authority to enter 
Australia.” The Department of Immigration and Citizenship uses the term ‘unauthorized boat arrivals’ 
or ‘unlawful boat arrivals’. Id. at 21. See also Magner, supra note 23. 
 27. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 28. Id. at 2–3. “The initial wave of boat people comprised 56 boats from Vietnam containing a 
total of about 2100 people. The first arrived in Northern Australia in April 1976 and the last in August 
1981. From November 28, 1989 to January 27, 1994 another eighteen boats arrived in a second wave 
of boats carrying 735 people.” Id.  
 29. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 26, at 6.  
 30. Id. at 7. See, e.g., PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 5. See also Katharine Betts, 
Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia, 9 PEOPLE & PLACE 34 (2001). Sociologist Katharine 
Betts analyzed opinion poll data on the issue of boat arrivals from the previous twenty-five years and 
her analysis showed that in the late 1970s, 60% of Australian’s wanted to let a limited number of 
refugees arriving by boat stay, between 7% and 13% wanted to let any number stay, and between 20% 
and 32% wanted to stop them from staying. Id. at 40. In 1993, 44% of people wanted to send boat 
people straight back without assessing their claims, and 46% approved of holding boat people in 
detention while their claims were being assessed. Id. at 41. Only 7% believed boat arrivals should be 
allowed to stay. Id. In September 2001, 77% of Australians supported the Howard Government’s 
decision to refuse entry to the Tampa and 71% believe boat arrivals should be detained for the duration 
of the processing of their asylum application. Id. at 41–42. 
 31. See Magner, supra note 23, at 59.  
 32. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 3. “[M]ost of the Indochinese asylum seekers 
arriving from 1976 to 1981 were housed in Sydney’s Westbridge Migrant Centre . . . . They were not 
allowed to leave the Centre during processing and had to report for rollcall daily.” Id. 
 33. Id. at 2.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/14
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The next wave of boat people, who arrived beginning in 1989,
34
 were 
met with the enactment of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 
1989, which “allowed officers to arrest and detain anyone suspected of 
being an ‘illegal entrant.’”35 This new policy essentially called for the 
“‘administrative detention’ for all people entering Australia without a 
valid visa . . . while their immigration status was resolved.”36 Due to the 
relatively limited number of arrivals, some argued that “policy responses 
by governments to unplanned migration in Australia over the years [has] 
been excessive.”37 
Nonetheless, these protests did not stop the Keating Government from 
introducing mandatory immigration detention for unauthorized arrivals in 
1992 with bipartisan support.
38
 Initially, the Migration Amendment Act 
1992
39
 was understood to be a “temporary and exceptional measure”40 
used to address “designated persons.”41 Subsequently, The Migration 
Reform Act 1992
42
 extended mandatory detention to all ‘unlawful non-
citizens’43 when the Act commenced on September 1, 1994. The Act made 
a distinction between visa “overstayers” and boat people in that the former 
were able to avoid detention by acquiring lawful status with the grant of a 
 
 
 34. Id. at 4. Between November 1989 and January 1994, eighteen boats arrived carrying mostly 
Cambodians, Vietnamese and Chinese nationals. Id.  
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 26, at 10.  
 38. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 5.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. Designated persons referred to Indochinese unauthorized boat arrivals. Id. The rationale 
given by then immigration minister, Gerry Hand, was: 
The Government is determined that a clear signal be sent that migration to Australia may not 
be achieved by simply arriving in this country and expecting to be allowed into the 
community . . . this legislation is only intended to be an interim measure. The present 
proposal refers principally to a detention regime for a specific class of persons. As such it is 
designed to address only the pressing requirement of the current situation. However, I 
acknowledge that it is necessary for wider consideration to be given to such basic issue as 
entry, detention and removal of certain non-citizens.  
Id.  
 42. See id. “The Act established a new visa system making a distinction between a ‘lawful’ and 
‘unlawful’ non-citizen. Under Section 13 of the Act, a migration officer had an obligation to detain 
any person suspected of being unlawful. The Act removed the 273-day detention limit which had been 
applied under the Migration Amendment Act 1992. Overstayers could apply for a bridging visa, which 
allowed them to stay in the community while their claims were assessed.” Id. at 6.  
 43. Unlawful non-citizen is defined as “a national from another country who does not have the 
right to be in Australia; that is they do not hold a valid visa. The majority of unlawful non-citizens in 
Australia at any given time have either overstayed the visa issued to them or are people who have had 
their visa cancelled.” PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 26, at 28. 
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bridging visa.
44
 In contrast, bridging visas were not made available to boat 
people.
45
 The Act also allocated liability to an unlawful non-citizen for the 
costs of his or her immigration detention due to the high costs of 
mandatory detention.
46
 
The purpose of extending mandatory detention to all unlawful non-
citizens was to “effectively regulate not only the determination of refugee 
status but also the removal of people who do not establish an entitlement 
to be in Australia.”47 Successive governments have claimed that 
mandatory detention is an integral part of supporting “the integrity of 
Australia’s immigration program” and ensuring “the effective control and 
management of Australia’s borders.”48 When John Howard won the 
federal election on March 2, 1996, he was sworn in as the Prime Minister 
of a country “preoccupied with domestic control over transnational human 
movement.”49 The Howard Government sustained this preoccupation by 
proposing legislation designed to reduce further boat arrivals and limit the 
number of people in detention.
50
  
This legislation began with the introduction of Temporary Protection 
Visas (“TPVs”) in October of 1999.51 TPVs allowed for many detainees 
who had been granted refugee status to be released into the community, 
 
 
 44. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 45. Id. In a speech, Minister Gerry Hand explained the Government’s rationale: 
In the Migration Reform Bill currently before the House I propose a range of measures to 
enhance the Government’s control of people who wish to cross our borders. . . . At present, 
we have an array of laws which govern detention and removal, depending upon how a person 
arrived in Australia. This is confusing to the public and administrators alike. The Bill will 
provide for a uniform regime for detention and removal of persons illegally in Australia. . . . 
Unlawful non-citizens who satisfy prescribed criteria will be able to acquire lawful status and 
release from detention by the grant of a bridging visa. Bridging visas will not be available to 
people who arrive in Australia without authority. Depending on their circumstances, they will 
be immediately removed from Australia or will be subject to detention until any claim they 
wish to make has been resolved. . . .  
 The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs also argued that there was a sound 
basis for the mandatory detention of anyone who had clearly bypassed the offshore entry 
processes required by Australia’s universal visa system. Visa overstayers on the other hand 
had ‘submitted themselves to a proper application and entry process offshore.’  
Id. at 6–7. 
 46. Id. at 6.  
 47. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 26, at 11. 
 48. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that supporters of Australia’s 
mandatory detention have claimed it is an integral part of highly developed visa and border controls 
necessary to maintain the integrity of world class migration and refugee resettlement programs). 
 49. Jane McAdam & Kate Purcell, Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstructing the 
Right to Seek Asylum, 27 AUST. YBIL 87, 92 (2008).  
 50. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 8. 
 51. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/14
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but only on a temporary basis.
52
 Although TPVs were widely criticized
53
 
by many, this did not discourage Howard from pushing a step further in 
response to the events of August 2001.  
On August 26, 2001, Australian search and rescue authorities located 
the “biggest boatload of asylum seekers ever to attempt to reach” 
Australia
54
 between Indonesia and Christmas Island.
55
 The sinking boat
56
 
was in need of assistance when Captain Arne Rinnan of a Norwegian 
container ship,
57
 called the MV Tampa, diverted from his route from 
Fremantle to Australia in order to respond to a rescue request from the 
Australian government.
58
 The Tampa rescued the passengers and headed 
toward Indonesia, the closest port.
59
 However, in acceding out of fear
60
 to 
passenger demands to be taken to Christmas Island in order to seek asylum 
in Australia, Captain Rinnan reversed course and headed for Christmas 
Island.
61
 
Before the Tampa reached Australian territorial waters, Captain Rinnan 
received a note from an Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
 
 
 52. Id. The Howard Government believed introduction of TPVs “would remove incentives for 
asylum seekers who were considering making the journey to Australia by boat.” Id. See also Peyser, 
supra note 16, at 448 (explaining the TPV was introduced after the number of unauthorized boat 
people rose from 921 in fiscal year 1998–99 to 4175 in 1999–00 in attempt to counterbalance the 
increase in numbers). “In order to discourage the perception of Australia as a soft target, asylum 
seekers who arrive illegally, e.g., by boat and without a visa, and who are owed protection obligations 
by Australia, are only provided with a temporary residence solution.” Id. 
 53. TPVs were criticized “for only providing protection for a limited period of time (three years 
initially); not allowing refugees to sponsor family members under the family reunion program (with 
the result that more family groups began to arrive by boat); and not affording access to the full range 
of government service provided to refugees with permanent visas.” PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, 
at 9.  
 54. See Peyser, supra note 16, at 431. See also Martin Flynn & Rebecca LaForgia, Australia’s 
Pacific Solution to Asylum Seekers, 2002 LAWASIA J. 31, 32 (2002) (explaining the boat was a twenty 
meter wooden fishing boat with an Indonesian crew and 433 predominantly Afghan passengers 
aboard).  
 55. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54, at 32.  
 56. Mary Crock, In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in 
the Management of Refugee Flows, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 49, 53 (2003). 
 57. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54 (describing the Tampa as a standard container ship that 
had a crew of twenty-seven and was licensed to carry no more than fifty people). See also Magner, 
supra note 23, at 53.  
 58. See Magner, supra note 23, at 53.  
 59. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54. 
 60. See McAdam & Purcell, supra note 49, at 93 (explaining Captain Rinnan received advice 
from Norwegian healthcare expert that ten unconscious survivors and one pregnant woman in 
considerable pain was a massive crisis). See also Penelope Mathew, Current Development: Australian 
Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 661 (2002) (explaining Captain 
Rinnan was pressured into changing course by five of his passengers, who had threatened to commit 
suicide).  
 61. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
592 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:585 
 
 
 
 
Immigration (“DIMA”) on August 27 directing him not to enter Australian 
territorial waters and not to advance on Christmas Island.
62
 Captain 
Rinnan was advised that if he attempted to disembark the asylum seekers 
aboard within Australia, he would subsequently be “subject to prosecution 
under the Migration Act 1958 for people smuggling.”63 As a result, the 
Tampa hovered approximately 13.5 nautical miles from Christmas Island 
for three days.
64
 Soon thereafter, the captain issued a distress signal as the 
Tampa was only equipped to hold 50 crewmembers, not provide basic 
services to 433 rescued passengers.
65
 Concerned about declining health 
and safety conditions
66
 on board, Captain Rinnan entered Australian 
waters despite Australia’s prior orders.67  
Following government orders, Special Air Service Forces seized 
control of the Tampa in order to prevent passengers from disembarking.
68
 
Ultimately, arrangements were made for New Zealand
69
 and Nauru
70
 to 
accept the asylum seekers with Papua New Guinea serving as a transit 
point.
71
 This marked the beginning of Australia’s new policy: the Pacific 
 
 
 62. Id. The legal basis for the Australian government’s refusal to disembark the rescued asylum 
seekers was never made entirely clear, although Howard’s mantra about border control and national 
security certainly played a domestic political role. The Howard government skillfully manipulated the 
events of 9/11 to suggest that the asylum seekers on board the Tampa might themselves be terrorists 
and thus presented a danger to the security of Australia, harnessing public support for the ensuing 
Pacific Solution. See also McAdam & Purcell, supra note 49, at 93. Prime Minister John Howard 
“vowed that Australia would send a message to a rising tide of illegal immigrants: the government 
would not allow the asylum seekers to set foot on Australian soil.” Magner, supra note 23, at 54. 
 63. See McAdam & Purcell, supra note 49, at 93–94.  
 64. Id. at 93.  
 65. See Magner, supra note 23, at 54. 
 66. See McAdam & Purcell, supra note 49, at 93 (explaining asylum seekers plead and 
threatened that they would jump overboard if taken to Indonesia). See also Mathew, supra note 60 
(explaining Captain Rinnan alerted Australian officials of scarcity of food and water on board and four 
persons on board were unconscious, one had a broken leg, and three were pregnant women). See also 
Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54(describing Captain Rinnan’s concern about safety of crew and 
medical conditions of asylum seekers because several were unconscious, one had a broken leg, and 
two pregnant women were in pain).  
 67. See Magner, supra note 23, at 54. 
 68. See Peyser, supra note 16, at 432.  
 69. See Magner, supra note 23, at 54 (explaining New Zealand, a party to the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, offered to accept up to 150 asylum seekers).  
 70. See Magner, supra note 23, at 55 (explaining Australia hastily negotiated agreement with 
Nauru, a non-party to the Convention, to process refugee claims). See also Flynn & LaForgia, supra 
note 54, at 33 (describing how Australia agreed to pay all of Nauru’s costs of holding and processing 
the asylum seekers).  
 71. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54, at 33. See also Savitri Taylor, The Pacific Solution or 
a Pacific Nightmare?: The Difference Between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing, 6 ASIAN-
PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2005) (explaining how Australia took advantage of fact that there is no clear 
obligation imposed on any state to take responsibility for rescuees who did not wish to return home in 
international law). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/14
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Solution.
72
 The Pacific Solution required asylum seekers who arrived 
aboard unauthorized vessels at excised places to be transferred to offshore 
processing centers on Nauru
73
 and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea
74
 
while their asylum claims were assessed.
75
  
The Pacific Solution consisted of three key pieces of legislation.
76
 In 
September 2001, Parliament passed the Border Protection Act, the 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, and the 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential 
Provisions) Act. The Border Protection Act retrospectively validated the 
actions taken by Australia with respect to the Tampa by “preventing the 
commencement or continuance of any civil or criminal proceeding 
challenging actions covered by the legislation.”77 The Border Protection 
Act also prescribed new border protection powers, including interdiction
78
 
and authorization of officers to remove people on detained vessels from 
Australia.
79
 In addition, the Border Protection Act clarified that the 
“exercise of any executive power of the Commonwealth to protect 
Australia’s borders” was not prevented by the Act.80  
 
 
 72. See Peyser, supra note 16. 
 73. JANET PHILLIPS & HARRIET SPINKS, DEP’T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES, THE ‘PACIFIC 
SOLUTION’ REVISITED: A STATISTICAL GUIDE TO THE ASYLUM SEEKER CASELOADS ON NAURU AND 
MANUS ISLAND 10 (2012), available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/ 
1893669/upload_binary/1893669.pdf. “The processing facility in Nauru comprise[d] two separate sites 
known as Topside and State House. . . . The Government of Nauru [agreed] that up to 1500 people 
may be accommodated in the processing facilities at any one time, under arrangements” which were to 
expire on June 30, 2005. Id. See also Taylor, supra note 71, at 22. “Nauru agreed to host 283 of the 
Tampa asylum seekers and 237 other asylum seekers intercepted by the Australian Navy. In return, 
Australia agreed to a AUD $20 million assistance package (equal to approximately twenty percent of 
Nauru’s gross domestic product).” Id. at 21. 
 74. See Taylor, supra note 71, at 29. “Papua New Guinea agreed to host an identified group of 
225 asylum seekers and to consider hosting further groups of asylum seekers” until an expiry date of 
October 21, 2002. “The only formal funding . . . Papua New Guinea received in exchange for its 
assistance was that Australia would meet all the costs associated with the asylum seekers.” Id.  
 75. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 26, at 14. See also Mathew, supra note 60, at 662. 
 76. Id. See also Crock, supra note 56, at 70.  
 77. See Crock, supra note 56, at 70. 
 78. See McAdam & Purcell, supra note 49, at 96. The Australian Defence Force developed an 
operational strategy under the code name “Operation Relex.” “Operation Relex marked a significant 
shift in Australia’s border protection strategy, which had previously been limited to the reactive 
detection, interception, and escort of unauthorized boats in Australian waters to Australian ports. It 
extended the government’s new border protection policy beyond the border itself by combining 
operational strategies of disruption, interception, and deterrence on the high seas. The fundamental aim 
was to prevent the entry of unauthorized vessels into territorial waters and thereby deter asylum 
seekers . . . from targeting Australia.” Id.  
 79. See Mathew, supra note 60, at 663. 
 80. Id.  
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The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 
introduced a new concept of place, the excised offshore place,
81
 and a new 
concept of asylum seeker,
82
 the offshore entry person. The Act gave the 
Prime Minister discretion to declare certain parts of Australia’s offshore 
territory to be outside the “migration zone” to prevent asylum seekers 
from exploiting these locations in order to disembark and claim asylum.
83
 
As a result, Christmas, Ashmore, Cartier, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
were excised from Australia’s migration zone.84 Non-citizens arriving 
unlawfully at the aforementioned places, referred to as “offshore entry 
persons,” were deemed not to have entered Australia’s migration zone and 
were unable “to make a valid application for a visa to Australia, including 
Protection Visas, unless the bar on the visa application process was lifted 
at the discretion of the Minister.”85 Moreover, denial of a visa disallowed 
further recourse to rights, as an appeal of the Minister’s decision was not 
permitted.
86
 “The result of this law is a complete denial of access to 
refugee tribunals, appeal procedures, and legal representation—in short, to 
the refugee protection system of Australia.”87 
The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) 
(Consequential Provisions) Act allows Australian officials to detain 
offshore entry person in Australia or remove them, with reasonable force if 
necessary, to a declared country.
88
 The Prime Minister has the authority to 
declare that a particular country: 
(i) provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective 
procedures for assessing their need for protection; and 
(ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending 
determination of their refugee status; and 
 
 
 81. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54, at 40 (defined excised offshore place to mean 
Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Island, Australian seas and resources 
installations, any prescribed island of a State or Territory). 
 82. Id (defined offshore entry person as an asylum seeker who enters an excised offshore place 
without permission). 
 83. See Crock, supra note 77. 
 84. See Mathew, supra note 60, at 664. 
 85. See PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 10. 
 86. Catherine Skulan, Australia’s Mandatory Detention of “Unauthorized” Asylum Seekers: 
History, Politics and Analysis Under International Law, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 61, 74 (2006).  
 87. Id.  
 88. See Flynn & LaForgia, supra note 54, at 40 (defined declared country as one that the 
Minister has declared in writing to be a country that meets certain criteria according to Section 
198A(3) Migration Act 1958, including the provision of access, for persons seeking asylum, to 
effective procedures for assessing their need for protection).  
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(iii) provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, 
pending their voluntary repatriation to their country of origin or 
resettlement in another country; and 
(iv) meets relevant human rights standards in providing that 
protection.
89
 
Australia negotiated agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea to be 
declared countries and admit asylum seekers.
90
 The Act also extended the 
1999 version of the TPV by creating two new visa classes, for asylum 
seekers intercepted in transit to Australia
91
 and offshore entry persons.
92
  
III. PRECARIOUS PACIFIC SOLUTION: INHUMANE AND CONTRAVENTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW?  
Australia is a signatory to virtually every major international human 
rights agreement, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),93 the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),94 the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“CAT”),95 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).96 
 
 
 89. Mathew, supra note 60, at 664. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. Visa subclass 451 applies to people who spend more than seven days in another safe 
country en rout to Australia, but who is not an offshore entry person. Visa subclass 451 is only 
temporarily issued for five years. They may apply for a permanent visa after four and a half years, and 
their family can only join them after they successfully obtain a permanent visa. See also Skulan, supra 
note 86, at 76.  
 92. Id. Visa subclass 447 is for offshore entry persons. Visa 447 is granted for three years, and 
holders of this visa are precluded from applying for a permanent protection visa. See also Skulan, 
supra note 86, at 76.  
 93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The 
ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that obligates countries that have ratified the treaty to respect and 
preserve basic civil and human rights of individuals such as the right to life and to human dignity, 
equality before the law, freedom of speech, assembly and association, religious freedom and privacy, 
freedom from torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary detention, gender equality, fair trial and minority 
rights. The ICCPR is a part of the International Bill of Human Rights. Australia signed the treaty on 
December 18, 1972 and ratified on August 13, 1980. 
 94. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 . The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty that obligates its parties to grant economic, social, 
and cultural rights to individuals. The ICESCR is a part of the International Bill of Human Rights. 
Australia signed the treaty on December 18, 1972 and ratified on December 10, 1975.  
 95. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The Convention Against Torture requires its signatories 
to prevent torture within their respective states and forbids them from returning people to their home 
country if there is likelihood the individual will be tortured. Australia signed the treaty on December 
10, 1985 and ratified on August 8, 1989.  
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Australia was also the sixth country to sign the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and is a party to its 1967 Protocol.
97
 Australia 
defends its policy of mandatory detention of unauthorized asylum seekers 
pursuant to its sovereign power to enact laws to protect its borders.
98
 
While this power is authorized, it may not be used by Australia to breach 
its obligations of international law. 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that 
“a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty.”99 Additionally, article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties mandates that “every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.”100 Australia’s mandatory detention regime contravenes these 
provisions and puts Australia in breach of international law. 
The international standard with regard to detention can be found in 
article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
101
 
According to article 9(1), “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
detention.”102 The term “arbitrary” goes beyond detention that is unlawful. 
The term has been defined by the UN Human Rights Committee as 
detention that includes elements of “inappropriateness, injustice, and lack 
of predictability.”103 A man who spent six years in Australia’s mandatory 
 
 
 96. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The Convention on 
the Rights of the Child recognizes the vulnerability of children and requires its parties to provide basic 
human rights to children including: right to survival, to protection from harmful influences, to develop 
to the fullest, and to participate fully in family, cultural, and social life. Australia signed the treaty on 
August 22, 1990 and ratified on December 17, 1990.  
 97. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The 1967 
Protocol removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the Convention. Australia joined the 
Convention on January 22, 1954 and the Protocol on December 13, 1973. The Convention Relating to 
the Status is Refugees is defines who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of state. The 
Refugee Convention, however, does not provide a right to claim asylum. “It has been long recognized 
that, according to customary international law, the right of asylum is a right of States, not of the 
individual; no individual, including those seeking asylum, may assert a right to enter the territory of a 
State which that individual is not a national.” See Ruddock v. Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, 45–46 
(Austl.) (footnotes omitted).  
 98. See Skulan, supra note 86, at 93. 
 99. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is a multilateral treaty regarding the international law on treaties 
between states. Australia ratified on June 13, 1974.  
 100. Id. 
 101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 93.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Van Alphen v. Netherlands, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990). See also 
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, DETENTION, AND PROTECTION 122 (2001), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3bcfdf (affirming 
the principle that “arbitrary embraces not only what is illegal, but also what is unjust”). 
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detention identified such inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of 
predictability with the following testimony: 
I know the feeling of humiliation because I have been humiliated. 
Not only me. They provoke people, they harass people, they 
humiliate people and they enjoy that. I never seen their regret or 
they feel sorry for us. Their job is simply to look after us but we 
been judged by them, why we came to Australia by boat. We do all 
the legal things, request form, ask officer for your own rights, which 
are not privileges. And they will deny you and provoke you. In 
detention, there is no law.
104
 
Pursuant to sections 183 and 196 of Australia’s Migration Act, ordering 
the release of asylum seekers from detention is prohibited by the courts.
105
 
This absence of judicial review puts Australia in violation of article 9(4) of 
the ICCPR, which affords a detainee the right “to take proceedings before 
a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of the detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”106  
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention expressed concern 
regarding the “lack of sufficient judicial review” when it visited Australian 
 
 
 104. See BRISKMAN, GODDARD, & LATHAM, supra note 1, at 134. See also PRAFULLACHANDRA 
NATWARLAL BHAGWATI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN AUSTRALIA: REPORT OF 
THE REGIONAL ADVISOR FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MISSION TO AUSTRALIA (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/ 
hurricane/hurricane.nsf/424e6fc8b8e55fa6802566b0004083d9/bc4c8230f96684c8c1256c070032f5f1/
FILE/ (describing detention as “prison-like”). See also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Executive 
Comm., Note on Accession to International Instruments and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers, U.N.H.C.R. Doc. EC/SCP/44 (Aug. 19, 1986), quoted in JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 370 (2005) (explaining “asylum seekers are treated far worse 
than prisoners in the prison system”). 
 105. Migration Act 1958 (Austl.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4afad9682. 
html. Section 183 states, “a court is not to order the release from immigration detention of a designated 
person.” Id. § 183. Section 196 reads as follows:  
(1) An unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 must be kept in immigration 
detention until he or she is: 
 (a) removed from Australia under section 198 or 199; or 
 (b) deported under section 200; or 
 (c) granted a visa. 
(2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) does not prevent the release from immigration detention of 
a citizen or a lawful non-citizen. 
(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) prevents the release, even by a court, of an unlawful non-
citizen from detention (otherwise than for removal or deportation) unless the non-citizen has 
been granted a visa. 
Id. § 196. 
 106. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 93. 
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detention centers in 2002.
107
 The group was also troubled by the lack of 
legal aid accessible by detainees and enquired about whether “judicial 
proceedings meet the requirements that courts must take a decision 
speedily.”108 These concerns revealed themselves to be warranted after 
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights argued in a submission to a senate 
committee that proposed legislation
109
 seemed to be “aimed at intimidating 
lawyers rather than improving access by asylum seekers to proper legal 
advice as to the merits of their claim.”110 Moreover, it is virtually 
impossible
111
 for the general public to gain access to detention centers, the 
location of detention centers inhibits attorneys from meeting sufficiently 
with their clients, and telephone and fax communication with clients is 
unreliable.
112
  
Australia also has obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention
113
 and its 1967 Protocol. The protections provided in article 31 
of the Refugee Convention ensure non-penalization of refugees who 
illegally enter or are present in a country.
114
 “Although over eighty percent 
 
 
 107. United Nations Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report 
of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Visit to Australia, 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.2 
(Oct. 24, 2002). 
 108. Id. at 22.  
 109. See BRISKMAN, GODDARD, & LATHAM, supra note 1, at 284. After refugee lawyers had 
success is assisting asylum seekers, the government subsequently targeted them. In March 2005, then 
immigration minister Amanda Vanstone announced legislation which ordered courts to consider the 
imposition of personal costs against lawyers and migration advisers who brought cases “which have no 
reasonable prospect of success.” See, e.g., Press Release, Migration Litigation Reform: Better Access, 
More Integrity (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31543/20050430-0000/ 
www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/media05/v05041.htm.  
 110. See BRISKMAN, GODDARD, & LATHAM, supra note 1, at 284.  
 111. Id. at 271. Many visitors experienced grave difficulty when visiting detention centers. A 
refugee supporter who visited Curtin detention center in January 2002 explained: 
I wasn’t allowed to visit but the manager told the people inside that we decided not to visit 
them. They had been waiting for us for a couple of months and had written submissions for us 
and nominated people to talk to us. People called us quite angry, saying why have you 
decided not to visit. Four of us tried walking in and they stopped us and said they couldn’t get 
a decision on whether we were allowed because the manager had gone fishing. 
Another visitor described her experience: 
One time we visited with another couple and the woman wasn’t allowed to visit. She had to 
go back and sit in the car for three hours because she didn’t have the right type of shoes on. 
She was wearing sandals instead of covered-in shoes and yet the detainees were coming over 
in sandals. It just didn’t seem to make sense. 
Id.  
 112. Id. at 279.  
 113. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 97. 
 114. Id. art. 31. Article 31(1) states:  
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, 
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of asylum seekers who have arrived without previous authorization in 
Australian territory in the last few years have been recognized as refugees, 
Article 31 is devoid of meaning unless it also extends ‘not merely to those 
ultimately accorded refugee status but also to those claiming asylum in 
good faith.’”115 As such, article 31 applies to all individuals detained in 
immigration centers, regardless of whether they ultimately obtain refugee 
status or not.  
Australia’s mandatory detention regime penalizes asylum seekers who 
arrive illegally by boat. The Australian High Court determined in 1992 
that detention laws are valid “if the detention which they require and 
authorize is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as 
necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an 
application for an entry permit to be made and considered.”116 Conversely, 
“if the detention which those sections require and authorize is not so 
limited . . . they will be punitive in nature.”117 This interpretation by the 
High Court aligns with the general understanding of article 31 that 
“[p]rovisional detention is permitted if necessary for and limited to the 
purposes of preliminary investigation.”118 The Australian Government 
reasoned that even if detention is punitive, it is permissible if a person 
spent at least seven days in a country where protection was available. The 
Government has argued that:  
[A] person to whom Australia owes protection will fall outside the 
scope of article 31(1) if he or she spent more than a short period of 
time in a third country whilst traveling between the country of 
persecution and Australia, and settled there in safety or was 
otherwise accorded protection, or there was no good reason why 
they could not have sought and obtained effective protection 
there.
119
  
 
 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for 
their illegal entry or presence. 
Id. 
 115. Skulan, supra note 86, at 96–97 (citing FRANK BRENNAN, TAMPERING WITH ASYLUM: A 
UNIVERSAL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM 159 (2003) (“In the last three years of the fourth wave of boat 
people, 82 percent of all Afghan and Iraqi applicants were found to be refugees by the primary 
decision makers . . . .”)). 
 116. Chu Keng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov’t and Ethnic Affairs (1992), 176 CLR 
1, 32 (Austl.). 
 117. Id. at 32.  
 118. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 103, at 109. 
 119. Skulan, supra note 86, at 98 (citing Dep't of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs, Article 31—Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge: An Australian Perspective, in 
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The Australian government’s argument cannot be supported by 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention. “Article 31 was intended to 
apply, and has been interpreted to apply, to persons who have briefly 
transited other countries . . . who have ‘good cause’ for not applying in 
such country or countries. The drafters only intended that immunity from 
penalty should not apply to refugees who had settled, temporarily or 
permanently, in another country.”120 Australia’s punitive mandatory 
detention is in breach of article 31(1) because of its harmful effects on 
detainees and foundation in deterrent objectives.  
Australia also contravenes article 31(2)
121
 of the Refugee Convention. 
Article 31(2) explains “after any permissible initial period of detention, 
States may only impose restrictions on movement which are 
‘necessary.’”122 According to the drafting history of the Convention, 
article 31(2) only provides for a “provisional right of detention for a few 
days.”123 Thus, an initial period of detention should not be long. The years 
that some asylum seekers have been detained clearly exceeds an initial 
period of detention. Australia’s mandatory detention regime also 
contravenes article 32
124
 of the Refugee Convention.
125
 Australia 
 
 
INTERPRETING THE REFUGEES CONVENTION—AN AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION 123–73, 135 (2002), 
available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/convention2002/10_illegal.pdf). 
 120. Id. at 98–99. 
 121. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 97. Article 31(2) states:  
The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other 
than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in 
the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting 
States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain 
admission into another country. 
Id. art. 31(2). 
 122. See Skulan, supra note 86, at 99. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 97. Article 32 states:  
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds 
of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security 
otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to 
appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or 
persons specially designated by the competent authority. 
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek 
legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during 
that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary. 
Id. art. 32. 
 125. Temporary protection schemes, such as Australia’s TPV, seem to contravene the Refugee 
Convention’s Article 33 obligation of nonrefoulment, because refugees, though not immediately 
returned, are eventually returned to their country of origin. See Hossein Esmaeili & Belinda Wells, The 
‘Temporary’ Refugees: Australia’s Legal Response to the Arrival of Iraqi and Afghan Boat-People, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/14
  
 
 
 
 
2014] AUSTRALIA AND THE REVIVAL OF THE PACIFIC SOLUTION 601 
 
 
 
 
essentially eliminated due process for asylum seekers who arrived at 
territorial islands. Although asylum seekers were processed for refugee 
status determination at Nauru and other islands, they were subsequently 
ejected from Australian territory
126
 without due process of law as required 
by article 32. Australia’s “disproportionately harsh migration laws 
pertaining to boat people”127 are illegal and breach international law.  
IV. CONCLUSION: A U-TURN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
One of the first matters on the Labor Party’s agenda when coming into 
power in 2007 was to do away with the Pacific Solution. Prime Minister 
Julia Gilliard described the policy as “costly, unsustainable and wrong as a 
matter of principle.”128 However, just a few years later, Prime Minister 
Gillard is planning to revive the Pacific Solution. Prime Minister Gillard 
has been able to dodge the bullet by attributing these changes to an expert 
panel she appointed to break a political deadlock. “The panel, led by the 
former head of the defence force, Angus Houston, called for moth balled 
detention centers on Nauru and the Papua New Guinean Island of Manus 
to be reopened immediately.”129 The government accepted all of the expert 
panel’s twenty-two recommendations130 on the policy options available to 
prevent asylum seekers from attempting to get to Australia by boat.  
 
 
23(3) U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 224, 238–40 (2000). See also Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, supra note 97. Article 33 states: 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which 
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
Id. art. 33. 
 126. Peyser, supra note 16, at 458 (“Australia’s new interpretation of the word ‘territory”’ 
exscinds territorial islands from migration territory, while the UNHCR asserts that international 
obligations apply ‘whenever a state acts,’ regardless of whether in territorial or extraterritorial 
waters.”). 
 127. Id. at 459.  
 128. Marks, supra note 8. 
 129. Id. 
 130. A. HOUSTON, P. ARISTOTLE, & M. L’ESTRANGE, REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS (2012), available at http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
report/expert_panel_on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf.  
1. The Panel recommends that the following principles should shape Australian 
policymaking on asylum seeker issues (paragraphs 2.6-2.22): 
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Under the “no advantage” principle put forth by the expert panel, 
asylum seekers may face lengthy periods in detention centers while their 
cases are assessed in order that they are not advantaged over others who 
have not traveled by boat.  
Consequently, many refugee advocates
131
 have renewed concerns with 
regard to the conditions of the offshore detention centers, the lack of 
scrutiny, and the mental health impacts on those held in detention centers. 
 
 
 The implementation of a strategic, comprehensive and integrated approach that 
establishes short, medium and long- term priorities for managing asylum and mixed migration 
flows across the region. 
 The provision of incentives for asylum seekers to seek protection through a managed 
regional system. 
 The facilitation of a regional cooperation and protection framework that is consistent in 
the processing of asylum claims, the provision of assistance while those claims are being 
assessed and the achievement of durable outcomes. 
 The application of a ‘no advantage’ principle to ensure that no benefit is gained through 
circumventing regular migration arrangements. 
 Promotion of a credible, fair and managed Australian Humanitarian Program. 
 Adherence by Australia to its international obligations. 
2. The Panel recommends that Australia’s Humanitarian Program be increased and 
refocused: 
 The Humanitarian Program be immediately increased to 20,000 places per annum 
(paragraphs 3.3-3.8). 
 Of the 20,000 places recommended for the Humanitarian Program, a minimum of 12,000 
places should be allocated for the refugee component, which would double the current 
allocation (paragraphs 3.3-3.8). 
 Subject to prevailing economic circumstances, the impact of the Program increase 
(recommended above) and progress in achieving more effective regional cooperation 
arrangements, consideration be given to increasing the number of places in the Humanitarian 
Program to around 27,000 within five years (paragraphs 3.3-3.8). 
 The Humanitarian Program be more focused on asylum seeker flows moving from source 
countries into South-East Asia (paragraphs 3.3-3.9). 
3. The Panel recommends that in support of the further development of a regional 
cooperation framework on protection and asylum systems, the Australian Government expand 
its relevant capacity-building initiatives in the region and significantly increase the allocation 
of resources for this purpose (paragraphs 3.26-3.28). 
4. The Panel recommends that bilateral cooperation on asylum seeker issues with Indonesia 
be advanced as a matter of urgency, particularly in relation to: 
 The allocation of an increased number of Humanitarian Program resettlement places for 
Indonesia (paragraphs 3.20-3.22). 
 Enhanced cooperation on joint surveillance and response patrols, law enforcement and 
search and rescue coordination (paragraphs 3.20-3.22). 
 Changes to Australian law in relation to Indonesian minors and others crewing unlawful 
boat voyages from Indonesia to Australia (paragraphs 3.20-3.22). 
5. The Panel recommends that Australia continue to develop its vitally important 
cooperation with Malaysia on asylum issues, including the management of a substantial 
number of refugees to be taken annually from Malaysia (paragraphs 3.23-3.24). 
Id.  
 131. PHILLIPS & SPINKS, supra note 2, at 10.  
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In the Australian Human Rights Commission’s view, “there is an urgent 
need for the Australian Government to end the current system of 
mandatory and indefinite detention, and to make greater use of 
community-based alternatives that are cheaper, more effective and more 
humane than holding people in immigration detention facilities for 
prolonged periods.”132 
“During the past two decades, successive governments have introduced 
legislation specifically aimed at restricting the legal appeal rights of non-
Australian citizens: they are routinely denied legal aid; their detention is 
not judicially reviewable; they have no legally enforceable right to a 
minimum standard of care while in detention; and some are made to pay 
for their incarceration.”133 In order for the Australian government to take a 
step in the right direction, it must make fundamental changes with regard 
to the human rights issues arising from the Pacific Solution. The most 
fundamental changes Australia should, and are urged to, make are to 
remove racism,
134
 restore human rights,
135
 and reinstate accountability.
136
 
 
Kaitlyn Pennington-Hill

  
 
 
 132. VENTURINI, supra note 5. 
 133. See BRISKMAN, GODDARD, & LATHAM, supra note 1, at 391. 
 134. Id. at 392 (steps to remove racism include: abolishing mandatory detention, restore full 
access to judicial review of migration decisions, ensure any immigration detention longer than 48 
hours is judicially reviewed, guarantee minimum standards in detention and a legal right to enforce 
them). 
 135. Id. (steps to restore human rights include: incorporate human rights conventions into 
domestic law, close all isolation facilities in detention centers, offer non-detention-based reparation 
assistance to failed asylum seekers, grants Australian citizenship to asylum seekers found to be 
stateless). 
 136. Id. at 393 (steps to reinstate accountability include: hold a coronial investigation into the 
deaths of asylum seekers, immigration detainees and those refused asylum in Australia, allow media, 
human rights groups, religious leaders, and politicians to make unannounced visits to detention 
centers, resource an independent authority to effectively investigate immigration detainee complaints 
and make binding recommendations for their resolution). 
   J.D./M.B.A. Candidate (2015), Washington University in St. Louis; B.A. (2011), University 
of Houston. First and foremost, the author wishes to give all the glory to God. Thank you, Lord. The 
author would also like to express her deepest gratitude to the many people who guided, supported, and 
encouraged her throughout life, law school, and this Note including her grandparents, parents, sisters, 
and extended family and friends. 
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